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It seems, on first reading, that Lacan did not mention Japan very often. 
However, when his teaching is examined more closely, it becomes clear that 
he often referred to Japan. Among his many references to Japanese culture, 
his encounter with Zen was particularly striking. This encounter forms the 
basis for a possible dialogue between Lacan’s work and Japanese philosophy, 
especially that of Nishida Kitarō. Both started by returning to Descartes. 
Where Lacan was seeking to conceptualize the subject of the unconscious, 
Nishida was formulating his theory of the true self. Both were looking for a 
different kind of subject than that usually found in Western philosophy. Their 
returns to Descartes were intended to go beyond his thought, to open up a 
different approach, with Zen serving as a point of reference. The resonances 
between Lacan’s and Nishida’s ways of thinking as explored in this article 
serve as the basis for a reflection on the relevance of psychoanalysis and the 
possibility of analytic experience in Japan.
Keywords: Lacan, Nishida Kitarō, Descartes, meditations, topology, subject, 
basho, Real, psychoanalysis, Japan
Introduction
At first glance, Lacan seems to have had little to say about Japan. The little that he did say 
hardly seems to provide much of a basis for an encounter, whether between the experience 
of Japanese philosophy and that of psychoanalysis, between psychoanalysis and the Japanese 
language, or even between East and West or psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism. Lacan’s 
most direct references to Japan are found in the preface to the Japanese translation of his 
Écrits and in his article “Lituraterre.”1 However, other references are strewn throughout his 
seminars.2  These are rarely in-depth discussions or analyses, but Lacan’s frequent evocation 
of Japan suggests that he had a certain attraction to, and knowledge of, its culture. His 
references are varied, sometimes serving to paint a picture of a concept or idea, but often 
1 Lacan 2001; Lacan 2013.
2 Translator’s note: Although he did publish written works during his lifetime, Lacan did much of his theoretical 
exploration in the context of seminars he gave from 1953 to 1980. These seminars, which were recorded and 
transcribed, are still being published in edited French versions and translated into other languages. 
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also providing a contribution to psychoanalysis. In the course of his seminars, Lacan speaks 
of Japanese art, architecture, prints, ikebana, theatrical forms, Zen, kakemono, calligraphy 
and especially writing. He also accords a particular place to stories, filled with fascination, 
of his own exploration of the Japanese archipelago.3
There are also traces of Japan within several areas of Lacan’s own theory and practice, 
in particular in his work on the question of the subject.4 This question, although it played 
less of a role for Freud, was a constant object of Lacan’s theoretical elaborations.5 Over 
time, it took on central importance and became one of the major features of psychoanalytic 
treatment, understood as a process in which the subject of the unconscious is brought to 
the fore: “Wo Es war, soll Ich werden,” “Where it was, there must I come to be as a subject.”6 
This subject evades conscious knowledge, and in practice, is found only in the various 
formations of the unconscious, from the slip of the tongue to the symptom. As we shall see, 
certain aspects of this Lacanian practice are not unrelated to Lacan’s way of taking up Zen. 
Indeed, it does not seem possible to dissociate Lacan’s reading of Zen from his return to 
Descartes and his depiction of the subject as sustaining or supporting itself by a void.
This is where there can be an encounter—albeit one that did not occur during 
Lacan’s lifetime—with Japanese philosophy, and in particular with the Kyoto school, 
whose founder, Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎, also took a return to Descartes as his point of 
departure.7 Nishida’s critical examination of the Cartesian cogito guided his own elaboration 
of a new subject, which he tried to extricate from the rut of classical Western philosophy’s 
reflexivity and subjectivism. Inspired by his work with Zen Buddhism, Nishida was led to 
set occidental ontology against another way of reaching the subject. This is the precise point 
where the Lacanian and Japanese ways of thinking meet: a theory of the subject that relies 
on topology.
Having explored this terrain, we will then examine the relative relevance and perhaps 
even irrelevance of psychoanalysis in Japan. That is, we will try to see whether Lacan’s 
rather glib statement that Japanese people do not need to be, or even cannot be, analyzed 
holds up.8 More specifically, we will examine the singularities of the Japanese language, as 
written and spoken, to see where psychoanalytic practice encounters a stumbling block in 
this culture, which is marked by the elision of the subject.
3 Lacan 2013, p. 330.
4 Other themes, such as temporality, the treatment of the object and even negation, could be included here, but 
space here does not allow a full treatment of the rich parallels between Lacan and Japanese philosophy. Instead, 
we propose to open up, in a more introductory manner, the points of convergence between the psychoanalytic 
and Japanese ways of thinking, to serve as an invitation to additional research.
5 It is important to note that there is virtually no conceptualization of the subject in Freud’s work. It was Lacan 
who introduced this term to express a first-order concept in psychoanalysis.
6 Translator’s note: The standard English translation of Freud’s statement is “Where id was, there ego shall be” 
(Freud 1964, p. 80). It should be noted that Lacan found the standard English and French translations of 
this statement particularly unsatisfying, so much so that he returned to the matter several times, proposing 
different French glosses. See, for example, Lacan 2006a, pp. 347−48 and Lacan 2006d, p. 678. The version 
here is Fink’s translation of Lacan’s rendering in “Science and Truth,” 2006b, p. 734.
7 In connection with this, we note that if Nishida had any knowledge of psychoanalysis, he would have thought 
that it concerned the pathological and was, for that reason, outside his purview.
8 Lacan 2001, p. 498.
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Lacan, Zen Master?9
If there were any figure in the long course of human history with which Lacan, both as 
teacher and as psychoanalyst, would have wanted to be identified, it would be the Zen 
master.10
On one occasion Lacan went so far as to say that he was a Lacanian because he had 
taken a few Chinese lessons.11 He could have added that it was also because he thought so 
highly of Zen.12
The figure of the Zen master appears at the beginning of Lacan’s first seminar:
The master breaks the silence with anything―with a sarcastic remark, with a kick-
start. That is how a buddhist master conducts his search for meaning, according to the 
technique of zen. It behoves the students to find out for themselves the answer to their 
own questions. The master does not teach ex cathedra a ready-made science; he supplies 
an answer when the students are on the verge of finding it.13
This statement, along with others found throughout Lacan’s teaching, evinces a certain 
knowledge, a certain keen awareness of ways in which psychoanalysis and Zen overlap. The 
figure of the Zen master can be found everywhere in Lacan’s style, as much in his practice 
as in his teaching. This master is to be understood not in the traditional sense—as someone 
who bestows knowledge or causes it to circulate—but instead as someone who feigns 
knowledge so that a possible response or enlightenment can happen to, or for, his student.
Analytic practice as elaborated by Lacan is reminiscent of Zen mondō 問答:14 sessions 
involving kōan—paradoxical, enigmatic, or even odd questions—uttered by the Zen 
master, to whom the student responds in terms of his or her own degree of enlightenment. 
The aim is not to close knowledge off but rather to let go of meaning, thereby freeing 
oneself from one’s certainties and subjective illusions. These sessions are held with specific 
students; their purpose is not to impart universal knowledge, but rather to lead a particular 
  9 This is a reference to Maurice Pinguet’s article which was first published in 1981 in the Japanese journal 
Gendai shisō under the title “Lacan homme de lettres” [Lacan, A Man of Letters]. It was later published in 
France under a different title, Stèle pour Jacques Lacan [Stele for Jacques Lacan] in the collection Le texte 
Japon [The Text of Japan]. This text is an excellent exploration of Lacan’s interest in Zen and its influence on 
his work. “Lacan, Zen Master?” could also evoke the French title of Stuart Schneiderman’s book of the same 
name (originally published in English as Jacques Lacan: The Death of an Intellectual Hero), which is not about 
Lacan and Zen, but rather about the place of death in psychoanalysis. 
10 Pinguet 2009, p. 69.
11 Lacan 2006c, p. 36.
12 It is interesting to note that Lacan was speaking specifically of Zen and not, for example, of its Chinese or 
Korean correlates. 
13 Lacan 1988, p. 1.
14 Literally, these are sessions of questions (mon 問) and responses (tō 答) between a master and a disciple. 
Kōan are what is said (énoncés). If some of these statements seem easy to understand, at least initially, their 
deeper resonance is not directly accessible. They should not be taken literally; they can be considered kōan 
because they need to be worked out with the help of a deep knowledge of psychoanalysis and, most especially, 
with the experience that psychoanalytic practice provides. In this way, the statement “The unconscious is 
structured like a language” is not merely a matter of linguistics, but refers instead to the place of speech in 
the analytic experience. The fact that it is a question of “a” language highlights how this speech cannot be 
reduced to a system of communication.  
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individual towards enlightenment. Similarly, impromptu interruptions of a meditation 
(zazen) are also a form of kōan, a relinquishing of the totalizing search for meaning. Lacan’s 
technique of the variable-length psychoanalytic session likewise makes use of cutting and 
unpredictable interruptions that function as interpretations intended to encourage a similar 
type of subjective letting go.15 The position of the analyst is akin to that of the Zen master. 
Neither is concerned with providing appropriate, suitable answers; on the contrary, they 
seek to allow a singular and non-universal knowledge, one that is specific to the subject, to 
appear. The student and the analysand must each find their own ways, without stopping at a 
response that closes down or “sutures” the process.
Lacan’s teaching is replete with enigmatic statements. They function as do kōan: 
they are not meant to be explained, do not “make sense” and are impossible to grasp.16 
No pat answers are given, but instead there is an invitation to ask oneself questions, to 
mull over statements that evade comprehension. In Zen and in Lacanian analysis, there 
is no Weltanschauung or dogmatic system, such as those found in most religions and 
philosophical models.17 This may be a consequence of the fact that both Zen and Lacanian 
analysis are practices rather than belief systems or doctrines. Their goal is not to induce an 
individual to adapt to an environment or a group, or to adopt a school of thought. What 
is important, instead, is the liberation, the awakening, the enlightenment and the effort 
towards subjective destitution, through which the subject is freed of the mirage of speech 
and of narcissistic illusion.18
Lacan’s interest in Zen was not accidental. It is one place that leads us to investigate 
the connection between Lacanian and Japanese approaches, in particular as concerns the 
question of the subject. To this end, it will be useful here to discuss the Kyoto school in 
greater detail. 
The Kyoto School
Contemporary Japanese philosophy has worked to open up an intercultural exchange with 
Western philosophy, which even now suffers from an “inability to conceive of the cultural 
reality of the other.”19 It invites European philosophy to cast off its mantle of ethnocentrism 
to achieve “a conceptual melting pot” where East and West will meet.20 This ethnocentrism 
has been so pervasive that Hegel, for example, thought that non-Western philosophies—
philosophies that do not descend from the Ancient Greeks, the only possible point of 
departure—are, at best, forms of animism.
15 Regarding the technique of interpretation, there is a direct echo between the techniques used by the Zen 
master and Lacan’s concepts of citation, of enigma and of equivocation. See Lacan 2007, pp. 29–38.
16 Examples of such statements include: “The Real is the impossible”; “The unconscious is structured like a 
language”; and “There is no such thing as a sexual relationship.”
17 The process and transmission of both Zen and psychoanalysis cannot occur independently of experience. As 
we shall see, the question of experience plays a crucial role in Lacan’s teaching and Nishida’s thought.
18 This is quite reminiscent of the development in Lacan’s understanding of how a psychoanalysis ends. Early 
on, he held that it was a matter of symbolizing, but later he described it as a subjective destitution.
19 Stevens 2005, p. 8.
20 Stevens 2005, p. 10.
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Japanese philosophy is not concerned simply with prolonging Western philosophy or 
with opposing it on ideological grounds, but instead with an effort to draw out those aspects 
that can enable us to move beyond modernity. 
But how can this move be achieved? This question is the point of departure for the 
Kyoto school, which located the origin of the impasse of Western philosophy in the theory 
of the subject inherited from Descartes’ cogito. Under the impetus of Nishida Kitarō’s work, 
a critique of positivism—of the objectivism inherent in Cartesian science—developed. The 
notion of moving beyond modernity goes hand in hand with a search for a new, more open 
subjectivity. This subjectivity is no longer trapped in the parochial limits of the subject/
object dichotomy, the tendency to objectify being, the failure of the mind/body split and 
the Cartesian ego, which always misses the essential point: the subject exists by not being. 
Japanese philosophy regards Buddhism, and Zen in particular, as a necessary reference 
point in this traversal. Nishida’s work, however, is not a sort of religious philosophy, 
any more than it is an elucidation of Zen Buddhism or a renewed appeal to traditional 
Buddhist beliefs. Instead, it is more like an attempt to create a dialectic between religion 
and philosophy. For Nishida, the essence of Buddhism provides a basis from which a new 
articulation of the subject, with its specific historical and cultural reality, can be brought 
into play.
Nishida’s perspective thus “advocates a balance between the individual and the 
group.”21 Given that this dialectical relation takes its cues from Zen, the void plays an 
almost obligatory role. It is constantly present in Nishida’s work and in that of his students 
and colleagues, although they sometimes use different terms: “nothingness” (Nishida), 
“emptiness” (Nishitani Keiji 西谷啓治) or the “in-between” (Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎). 
Each of them, with their individual styles and concerns, would take up Zen and its unique 
way of interweaving with philosophy.22
The philosophical approach of the Kyoto school is topological and pragmatic rather 
than rationalist or essentialist. In keeping with the precepts of Shinto and Japanese 
Confucianism, this school regards each action, individual and thing as being defined by 
the place it occupies. Likewise, the subject itself can never be an essence or a substance; 
it cannot be objectified. It can only be defined or even approached topographically 
or topologically, in terms of its location or position (as is also expressed by the terms 
“nothingness,” “emptiness” and the “in-between”). This Japanese philosophy responds to 
Western philosophy’s rationalist and logocentric ego with a topocentric approach that seeks 
a new form of subjectivity. As Jacynthe Tremblay states, Nishida, Nishitani and Watsujji 
share a common cause: “the search for a new type of subjectivity, one that is no longer self-
centered, but instead is already situated within the World with which it is engaged.”23 Much 
of this is evocative of Lacan’s work; to draw this point out, it will be useful to look more 
closely at the thought of the Kyoto school’s founder.
21 Tremblay 2007, p. 36. More precisely, as Tremblay notes, “…Nishida’s model of relationality (…) borrows 
simultaneously from Western individualism and Japanese collectivism.”
22 They were inf luenced not only by Zen, but also, and perhaps somewhat less fruitfully, by Shinto and 
especially by Japanese Confucianism. On this, see Stevens 2005, pp. 43–71.
23 Tremblay 2010, p. 36.
178
Xavier BLONDELOT and Marie-Jean SAURET
Nishida, Precursor of a Relational Approach
Nishida Kitarō (1870−1945) was born in Unoke, Ishikawa prefecuture during the Meiji 
period (1868−1912), a time when Japanese society was opening itself to the outside world 
and becoming more modern. This Westernization was consensual and touched all areas 
of social life, including economic structures, politics and cultural forms and institutions. 
“Consensual” here means that Occidental ideas came to pervade Japanese society as a result 
of the effort to reconcile modernism with traditions. It was at this time that philosophy re-
ally took hold in Japan.24 This is not to say that there had not been any kind of philosophical 
reflection prior to this, but rather that philosophy had not been formalized as it had been in 
the West. It had not become an academic discipline in its own right. 
During the Meiji period, intellectuals from many disciplines were sent abroad to study 
new developments in Western research, which were to be brought back and introduced into 
Japan.25 This was the context in which Nishida began his philosophical work.
Nishida was determined to set up a dialogue, with a special focus on Zen, in which 
Western philosophy and Eastern traditions could encounter each other. This was a quite 
remarkable endeavor, because his contemporaries had only been interested in presenting 
philosophical ideas imported from Europe, without trying to add to them and make them their 
own. Nishida did not reject Western logic and concepts; he was more concerned with placing 
them in a larger context by means of a comparison with traditional Japanese ways of thinking.
Such a project would also have the effect of bringing a breath of fresh air into the 
vacuum in which European and American philosophy tended to operate. The aim of this 
dialogue was not to “Japanize” Western philosophy, but instead to throw a lifeline to an 
approach lost in the meandering labyrinth of positivism and objectivism. 
This project made Nishida a pioneer and a precursor of the coming intercultural 
dialogue in philosophy.26 He constantly returned to Japanese tradition for inspiration 
as he strove to articulate the relations between Zen Buddhism and Western philosophy, 
enhancing the latter in the process.27 This is how he worked to realize his original aim of 
using Japanese thought to enrich a philosophy that had fallen into a subjective impasse.
Zen plays a key role in this. It is already discernible in the terminology employed, such 
as “awakening,” “negation,” and “nothingness.” These terms refer directly back to Zen, of 
which Nishida was a longtime adept. He first began to practice the discipline when he was 
seventeen, and according to his own accounts, he continued with it until he was thirty-
five.28 The influence of Zen can be felt in the primacy of experience in his work, in contrast 
with Western philosophy, where knowledge or logos plays this role. 
Although Nishida distanced himself from Zen practice at a certain point, his writings 
continued to be colored with references to Buddhism, from his initial explorations in A 
Study of the Good through his return to Descartes until the culmination of his work: the 
logic of basho 場所.
24 Nishi Amane 西周 (1829−97) gave philosophy its Japanese name: tetsugaku 哲学. Literally, this means the 
“science of wisdom.” 
25 This was not, however, the case for Nishida, who never traveled outside Japan.
26 Stevens 2005, p. 11.
27 In many places, the other two significant Japanese conceptual approaches—Confucianism and Shinto—
would also make their mark on his philosophical development.
28 Heisig 2001, p. 39.
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His writings can be grouped into three periods.29 In the first, from 1911 to 1926 which 
included A Study of the Good, Nishida distinguished himself not only by his grasp of Western 
philosophy but also by his ability to incorporate contributions from Japanese philosophy. 
The concept of self-awakening was central in this period. His idea is that the subject is an 
agent submitted to the logic of predication. This is a departure from the Aristotelian logic 
on which Western philosophy is based, with its autonomous, reflexive subject who creates its 
own world. Nishida’s subject has no substance because it is defined as a self-negation, by the 
fact that it is a non-subject. Further, the subject, or self-awakened self, could be attained only 
through action rather than by intellectualized thought: “Self-awakening begins at the place 
where self-consciousness arrives at its limits.”30 In other words, it involves desubjectification, a 
search for a more fundamental self that underlies the ego.31
Nishida’s second, shorter period (1926−30) featured the introduction of the focal 
concept of basho in his essay of the same name published in 1926. The “logic of basho” 
(bashoteki ronri 場所的論理) served as the source of what would establish his reputation. 
The literal meaning of “basho” is “place,” but it would not be correct to constrain the 
concept within a single term or univocal meaning. “Basho” is a highly polysemous term, so 
much so that it is preferable not to translate and thereby risk losing its varied nuances and 
subtle implications, in particular as regards to topology. 
The concept of basho is akin to Plato’s χώρα  or Khora, but is not coextensive with it.32 
Basho is a topographical or topological concept, which takes the place of subjectivism and 
of the search for the essence of being. In response to the subject defined as substance, to 
the dogma of being and of the self-sufficient individual, the logic of basho counters that 
the subject is positional, defined by its place, which is a non-substantial space based on a 
“nihilation” or a negation of being. This subject is defined by its predicate: in an action, in a 
positional manner, in terms of a basho. Ontology and its discourse on being are superseded 
by a form of meontology, a discourse on nothingness, which, for that reason, does not 
admit of being objectified, for nothingness cannot be circumscribed by any designation or 
definition.
During his last period, from 1930 to 1945, Nishida developed his theory of the world 
as historical, along with that of “absolute self-contradictory self-identity” (zettai mujunteki 
jiko dōitsu 絶対矛盾的自己同一). The latter is closely related to another aspect of his work: 
the introduction of relationality. This involves establishing a new perspective that advocates 
finding the balance between the individual and the group and thus reconciling Western 
individualism with the collectivism of Japan.33
29 Tremblay 2007, pp. 9–11.
30 Tremblay 2007, p. 24.
31 Stevens 2005, pp. 103–104.
32 Tremblay 2007, p. 59.
33 Tremblay 2007, p. 35.
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Lacan with Nishida: The Return to Descartes
I believe that we find ourselves in an epoch in which the subjectivist philosophy of 
modern times has been driven to an impasse and must be rethought from its funda-
mental principles.34
For Nishida, it was not enough merely to reiterate the positions of Western philosophy 
and to make do with its limitations. In the face of an overall trend towards neo-Kantian 
approaches, he called instead for a return to Descartes, in order to address the dead end of 
subjectivism and the crisis of the modern subject.
A few decades later, Lacan also went back to Descartes. If he had different reasons for 
doing so, his aim was quite similar: he was looking for a way to understand the subject of 
the unconscious.
Both Lacan and Nishida sought, first and foremost, a critical response to subjectivism 
and rationalism. Where Nishida was looking for a true self, which meditation would cleanse 
of the artifacts of consciousness, Lacan was trying to find the subject of the unconscious, 
which analytic practice would enable to emerge from the tribulations of the ego.35
Modern philosophy is haunted by the question of the subject, but this question 
has strayed far away from its Cartesian origins. Therein lies the interest, for both Lacan 
and Nishida, of returning to the initial stumbling block, to the impasse encountered by 
Descartes: the “cogito, ergo sum,” which posits that the subject is a substance. Nishida states:
I find that Descartes had already shifted from a negational self-awakening, that he had 
broken with a method of analysis based on self-awakening, when, with the cogito, ergo 
sum, he supposed that an external substratum exists. This sum is clearly what causes the 
problem.36
To return to Descartes is, first, to return to a method that leads to an unprecedented 
scrutiny of the self. To get to the point of the cogito, ergo sum, Descartes made use of 
meditation, a method of radical doubt that is, for Lacan, indispensable to the first 
formulation of the modern subject.
Likewise, both Nishida and Lacan approach the subject through an experiential 
practice: Zen meditation for Nishida and the exercise of psychoanalysis for Lacan. Nishida 
held that the subject could be apprehended only by acting and not by purely intellectual 
means or by some aspect of consciousness. Lacan, for his part, held that the subject of the 
unconscious could be approached only through the twists and turns of language in the 
practice of analytic free association. In no case is it the fruit of some kind of ratiocination; 
nor does it involve any sort of certitude. 
The important element here is “experience.” This term is frequently evoked by Nishida 
in the form of “pure experience” and by Lacan as “analytic experience.”
34 Nishida 2004, p. 274.
35 “Self-awakening by means of radical doubt, the analysis that is absolutely negational, should be philosophy’s 
most proper method, the method of the very science of philosophy. I take philosophy to be a self-awakening 
though negation, an analysis by means of self-awakening” (Nishida 2004, p. 255).
36 Nishida 1965, p. 259.
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The Cartesian experience is based on a series of negations. Everything is negated, up to 
and including existence as such. Yet, for both Nishida and Lacan, Descartes did not go quite 
far enough with this. Instead of pushing forward into the deepest possibilities of doubt, he 
stopped with the cogito, the “I” who “is” because “I am thinking.” He looked to the external 
world for the validation of this being, in a substratum of extension, and then left the 
problem to God. This was not, indeed, just any God: Descartes’ God was not a deceitful, 
“evil genius,” and was therefore able to provide a certain certitude about being. That is 
where the Cartesian approach stumbled, where its quest for the subject came to an end. 
The consequence of this was the advent of a subject brimming with subjectivism and even 
solipsism. This subject is made of substance, is reflexive; it is a subject of knowledge that 
becomes an object like any other and gives rise, among other repercussions, to a rejection of 
the body.37
We must now strive to rethink regular philosophy from the point of view of the self ’s 
awakening to this true self of practice, to a self of mind/body unity. That is why I hold 
that we must return once again to Descartes.38
Nishida makes a radical break with a philosophical heritage that progressively oriented 
itself ever more fully towards the field of consciousness, reason and ego. Spinoza, Kant and 
even Heidegger: none of these philosophers was able to avoid subjectivism. 
Nishida held both that consciousness is not where the true subject can be found and that 
the subject is not a substance. On the contrary, the subject is the effect of a nihilation obtained 
through self-awakening. It is a non-self. Like Lacan, Nishida also opposed psychologism—
the reduction of the subject to the individual—and stressed that it is impossible to separate 
the knowing from the knower.39 Consciousness cannot be totalizing; the subject cannot be 
reduced to it. This does not mean that the subject of consciousness is completely abandoned. It 
retains a place—but not an omnipotent one—in Nishida’s approach.
In his early work, Lacan also rejected, or worked to discredit, the idea of the 
subject. Until 1959, he ridiculed the subject because it carried the conceptual baggage of 
intersubjectivity, being and consciousness. This subject was a guileful liar, and was thus 
assimilated fundamentally into the Imaginary register, the register in which the body is 
thought to be a sphere.40 However, Lacan eventually came to advocate another subject, 
the subject of the unconscious. This subject has escaped from the rut of the “I” and its 
reflexivity. It becomes an effect of the signifiers that compose language and, “…properly 
speaking, does not designate a being but instead a lack-in-being that has been emptied 
of the blockages of the imaginary identifications of the ‘I,’ the cogitating rationalizations 
of philosophy and the substantialist aspirations of biology.”41 This subject is described as 
“nothing,” a blank, a hole, a lack and will move ever further from the notions of “person” or 
“ego,” while being increasingly based on an evocation of vacuity and thus of the Real.42
37 “Descartes’ great foreclosure [Verwerfung] was his ejection of the body from thought” (Lacan 1967, session of 
10 January 1968).
38 Nishida 2004, p. 267.
39 This is the principle of contradictory self-identity: the thinker is thought.
40 Lacan was concerned with the subject as liar from 1953 to 1959, until the shift in his seminar, “Desire and its 
Interpretation” (Le Gaufey 2009, pp. 13–16).
41 Pernot 2009.
42 Lacan 1961, session of 28 March 1962.
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Thus, for both Nishida and Lacan, the subject evades the usual philosophical ideas 
of identity, reflexivity and consciousness. It is a nonbeing that has ceased to be rendered 
a substance as it was for Descartes. Descartes’ error can be found at the very heart of the 
cogito’s halting of doubt.43 Descartes was not able “…to make of the I think a mere point of 
fading.”44 He stopped there, without following out his nihilating meditation to its end. This 
led him to miss the true, self-negating self. Instead, he ended up with the rejection of the 
body and a subject that was sutured.45 If, however, the subject is not to be confounded with 
being—if this is not a matter of ontology—how could it be apprehended?
To deal with the absence of ontology and being, Nishida has recourse to topology. 
Acceding to the true self necessarily involves an emancipation from the Aristotelian subject, 
a rejection of the model of the sphere in which the subject is made a substance. Sphere-
based worldviews always produce dualisms stemming from the opposition of interior and 
exterior and the splitting of subject and object. Now, Nishida argues that the true self can 
only be grasped at the place where the conscious self is nihilated, which is also the place in 
which body and mind are united.46 To refuse all dualism implies that subject and object 
are not separate, a position that is reminiscent of the advances Lacan made on object 
relations theory and on transference as a total phenomenon, as well as of his theory of the 
inseparability of the subject and the object a.
Generally speaking, the ego is thought of as a subjective unity, which possesses its various 
traits as if these were some kind of object. However, it ought to be a predicative rather 
than a subjective unity. It should be a circle, not a point; it should be a place and not an 
object. When a predicate cannot become a subject, the ego cannot fully know itself.47
To overcome the subject-object dichotomy, and to become aware of the true self, Nishida 
provides a topological approach with his logic of basho. The basic idea of this approach is 
that “everything that is, is located with respect to something.”48 This “something” implies a 
“lococentric” logic which is not, however, based on a spherical model.
Basho are distributed in three strata, in terms of what they encompass: the basho of 
consciousness, the basho of oppositional nothingness and the basho of absolute nothingness. 
Their features may be summarized as follows:
• The basho of consciousness is the least inclusive. It must be overcome in order to 
allow desubjectification to occur, but need not be utterly rejected. Its interest lies in 
its access to scientific and technical knowledge of the world. 
• The basho of oppositional nothingness is that in which relations between the true 
self and nature, as well as those among individuals, are located. 
43 This is different from Damasio’s critique. He speaks of Descartes’ error in terms of an inversion of the cogito: 
I am, therefore I think. Because I have a physical body—a brain and neurons—I can think. The organic thus 
takes precedence over thinking. For Nishida, it was rather a matter of showing that Descartes stopped too soon 
in his negation through doubt. To get to the true self, the ego must be nihilated: one must go below the “I.” 
44 Lacan 1978, p. 224.
45 Nishida 2004, p. 268.
46 Nishida 1965, p. 266.
47 Nishida, Basho, cited by Stevens 2005, p. 131.
48 Nishida 1965, p. 223.
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• The basho of absolute nothingness, the most encompassing, comes close to the Real 
for it cannot be defined, cannot be reduced to an object of knowledge and cannot 
be expressed in any word or image. It is in this basho that things can be nihilated 
and thereby become suitable for relation.49
Each basho is delineated in relation to the others, in terms of its dual noetic and 
noematic content, and is neither objectivized nor objectifiable.
The basho model enabled Nishida to propose a means of desubjectifying the subject 
through nihilation of the ego. To elucidate this, he made use of the figure of the circle 
or ring. The interest of this lies in the way that this figure makes emptiness exist, thus 
paving the way for a non-binary concept of the subject and a non-dualist concept of the 
true self. Here again there is a parallel in Lacan’s work: his explorations of topology are 
themselves variations on the question of the subject of the unconscious. From the torus to 
the Borromean knot, Lacan’s experimentations revolve around the attempt to locate the 
subject as a fundamental lack. The recourse to topology allows a subject that is disburdened 
of being and essence to appear. This subject, as in Zen, is sustained by the void. It is only 
emptiness, only a structuring void. 
Returning to Descartes via topology allowed both Nishida and Lacan to make the 
subject ex-ist. At the place where the “ergo” of the cogito had the effect of canceling out the 
division between “I think” and “I am,” where it hid the subject—that “effect of the void 
between the enunciation (I think) and the statement [énoncé] (I am)”50—topology gave 
them a way to bring forth another subject that is not ego, is not substance, is not coextensive 
with the individual and thus cannot be made an object.
Lacan, Nishida and the Real as Basho 
Now that we have explored the consonances between the work of Lacan and Nishida, we 
shall seek next to identify concepts that the two approaches share. Is it possible, for example, 
to develop a specifically Lacanian concept by using Nishida’s terms? 
Our argument here allows us to answer this question positively. Both Lacan and 
Nishida conceive of the subject though topology, make use of a logic of Place which 
dispenses with logos, allow for the subject-object split to be overcome, and thereby avoid 
the pitfalls of the Imaginary.51 These encourage a reification of the subject, which becomes 
merely the object of (its own) knowledge. In both approaches, there is a de facto rejection 
of intentionality as the determining factor of the subject’s future; this also decenters 
consciousness from the logic of the I. This is the thrust of Nishida’s critiques of Kant, whom 
he considers a pillar of pure science, and of phenomenology, which tried to overcome the 
logic of psychologism with another logic of psychologism based on consciousness.52 As 
49 Tremblay 2007, pp. 50–64.
50 Julien 1996, p. 37.
51 Here, logic is to be understood in terms of mathematical topology. Mathematical logic is used in order to 
lessen the effects of meaning, that is, the imaginary divagations inherent in the use of logos.
52 It is also reminiscent of what Lacan says during his seminar on the formations of the unconscious: “Think of 
Kant’s critique as the most profound challenge to the whole nature of the Real” (Lacan 1998, p. 57).
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we follow our two authors’ efforts to impede the totalization of knowledge unleashed by 
modern science, we will emphasize spatiality instead of temporality as grounded in logos; it 
is the latter approach that has led to the impasse of modern subjectivity.
These modern impasses of the subject, which can be found not only in the clinical 
approaches to acting and enacting, but also in the contemporary subject’s tendency to 
wander, cannot be dissociated from the effects of the discourse of science. The advent 
of modern science in the seventeenth century has not been without repercussions for 
subjectivity. One of the most fundamental of these is that science has brought about the 
rejection of the figures of the Real. As a discourse or form of social bond, science dispenses 
with Truth, the Subject and death, and it tosses everything to do with love into a dustbin of 
enigma.53 It does so with the collusion of the capitalist discourse, which leads the way. To 
this end, science propels us as individuals into the illusion that we can master ourselves and 
our bodies, although we are acted upon by a dimension that both exceeds and determines 
us: this is what Lacan calls the Real and Nishida calls the basho of absolute nothingness.
The Real can be transposed onto the basho—the basho of absolute nothingness—
first because the Real cannot be reduced to a concept. It is, instead, a place.54 Likewise, the 
basho of absolute nothingness, as Nishida formulates it, cannot be considered as just another 
“object of knowledge.”55 Both of these belong to the category of impossibility, which eludes 
scientific reasoning. It is not something that can be put into words, nor can it be reduced to any 
meaning, but it is, nevertheless, the condition of all possible meaning and speech. The Real is 
prior to logic and thus to any hooking together of signifiers. It pre-exists the human, despite the 
fact that the signifier is the best means we have to apprehend and deal with it. The Lacanian 
Real is irremediably non-objectifable. It is a place that cannot be represented, that eludes 
symbolization, but from which everything proceeds and from which the subject emerges. This 
is the same as the way in which Nishida described the basho of absolute negation:
In no case whatsoever can it be made into an object of knowledge. All that we can say 
is that it is a basho, the basho where everything is located (whether nature, individuals 
or knowledge), the basho in which everything is interrelated.56
On the basis of this conceptual equivalence, the question remains whether the notion 
of basho can contribute to that of the Real, and of whether it can thereby shore up the 
impasses of the subject and of the contemporary social bond. In the context of the excesses 
of rational thought, considering the Real as basho is above all else an attempt to reintroduce 
the subject that is foreclosed by science: to reintroduce a place for existing in suffering, in 
the violence of a world that never slows down. This must occur, as we have emphasized, in 
the context of a practice or exercise of the Real. 
From a clinical perspective, taking up the Real as a basho highlights the modern 
problems of those who are considered to be beyond or outside the subject, those for 
whom subjectivity is defective because it is not grounded in the singularity of the Real. 
“Beyond or outside” refers here to the wanderers—to those “dismissed cases” who exist 
53 When the figures of the Real are rejected by the discourse of science, the subject ends up, without any 
symbolic base, without any means by which to handle the support of its structure.
54 Melman 2009, pp. 115–30.
55 Tremblay 2007, p. 48.
56 Tremblay 2007, p. 48.
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only though their dismissal, to those who are lost or seem to have no place—but also to 
those who, because they cannot find their place, end up with no solution other than to 
exclude themselves from existence. They do so either through the drastic act of suicide or by 
shutting themselves off in different ways and shutting up, so that they end up subsisting in 
the shadows at the margins of the contemporary social bond.57 Lacking a place to exist, the 
ability to subjectify whatever place they do have, or with the help of the “genius” of their 
symptom, some such people find they have no other choice than to bow out of existence, 
temporarily or in a more radical manner.58 Thus, the cult of the ego—taking oneself to be 
an “I” rather than holding on in one’s own subjective place, which is the precondition of 
the Real as basho—fabricates subjects who have no place to exist, no place in which to find 
themselves because they have nowhere to stow their symbolic effects. The subject suffers 
because it is caught in the arcana of positivism, in which it does not manage to locate itself 
because it is stuck in the Imaginary. Lacking a way to find the self, lacking an inscription 
in the social link, without being able to make do with the real qua basho, we observe an 
“exponential increase in the waste from the social bond.”59
Conclusion: Is Lacan Relevant in Japan?
We have seen that there are many places at which Lacan’s way of thinking touches the 
Japanese way of thinking elaborated by Nishida. However, these points of intersection did 
not prevent Lacan from claiming that psychoanalysis was of no use to Japanese people 
because they are fundamentally unanalyzable. This claim had to do with the fact that 
Japanese writing allows for a kind of doubling between onyomi 音読み, the Chinese reading 
of ideograms, and kunyomi 訓読み, their Japanese reading. Lacan’s statement, however, needs 
a bit of qualification. First of all, it should be noted that Japanese writing cannot be reduced 
only to onyomi and kunyomi. In fact, Japanese writing requires three, or even four, different 
systems: kanji (ideograms), hiragana and katakana.60 To write in Japanese requires at least 
the first two, because there are things that cannot be written with ideograms alone. The 
hiragana system is necessary to write the enclitics which run through Japanese sentences, and 
thus to express words that do not have an ideogram. For this reason, it is impossible to write 
a sentence only with kanji.61 The katakana system is mainly used to write terms that come 
from other languages. Next, it is important to note that one kanji can have a wide variety 
57 This implies not only withdrawing from the social bond but also the wanderings of depression.
58 The symptom is that which bears the best witness to the subject’s Real, to the way in which the subject works 
out its connection to the Real.
59 Sauret 2009, p. 87.
60 It requires four, if the rōmaji, or the letters of the Western alphabet, are included. We also note that hiragana 
and katakana are both syllabary systems.
61 For the benefit of readers not familiar with Japanese writing systems, it should be noted that Japanese requires 
the use of several writing systems. It has its own means, ends and uses. For one example, the sentence “Lacan 
is a psychoanalyst” is written as follows: ラカンは精神分析家です (Lacan wa seishinbunsekika desu). Because 
the word “Lacan” comes from a foreign language, it must be written with katakana: ラカン. It neither can nor 
should be written with kanji, even if they have the same pronunciation. は (wa), an enclitic that indicates the 
place of the subject, can only be written using hiragana. There is no kanji for that word. However, 精神分析
家 (seishinbunsekika) or “psychoanalyst,” is written with kanji because the needed ideograms do exist. Finally, 
there is no kanji for です (desu), which is roughly equivalent to the verb “to be,” so it is written in hiragana. 
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of different pronunciations in both onyomi and kunyomi.62 All of this is quite far away from 
the ideas of the univocal and of automatic transcription. In other words, Lacan’s assertion 
that Japanese people cannot be analyzed comes from an incomplete understanding of what 
Japanese writing actually involves.63
However, if there is not after all a linguistic barrier on this level, as Lacan had suggested, 
it is true that psychoanalytic practice has yet to make a place for itself in Japan.64 In the 
experience of one of the present authors, the word seishinbunseki 精神分析 (psychoanalysis) 
evokes something vague for many Japanese people. Many are not really sure to what, 
exactly, it refers. Experience has shown that when they are asked about this, after a moment 
of ref lection, they give answers that often bring in things that are quite distinct from 
psychoanalysis. For example, some responses have more to do with psychiatry, with university 
research or even with mind-reading, and others connect the term to psychotherapy or “life 
coaching,” which are considered more as a type of consumer product than anything else.65 
Thus, the task of finding a psychoanalyst is not straightforward in Japan.
Although psychoanalytic theory is quite well known in intellectual circles, the practice 
of psychoanalysis remains something of a little-known novelty.66 It has difficulties in 
establishing both its theory and its practice. Perhaps the origin of these difficulties is another 
characteristic of the Japanese language: the effacing of the subject.
In Japanese, the grammatical subject or the subject of the statement [énoncé] is not 
required when one speaks; Japanese is a contextualized language which can dispense 
with the grammatical subject, even while knowing how to use it.67 This may be explained 
by the fact that the ego and the individual tend to be subsumed within the collective 
nature of Japanese society. Insofar as the discovery of the unconscious presupposes the 
prior emergence of the Cartesian ego, it is perhaps not surprising that a language that can 
dispense with this ego would find it particularly problematic to sustain psychoanalysis 
within its culture. What interest could there be in undertaking a psychoanalysis if its search 
for truth does not make sense?68
62 Again for readers who have less experience with how Japanese is written, we note that even for this seemingly 
simple sentence, three writing systems are needed. If the foreign-language words are replaced with Japanese 
words, as in, for example, the sentence “Mishima is a writer” (三島は小説家です), only two writing systems 
are needed, but that is the lowest number possible. Here 三島 reads “Mishima” and 小説家 (shōsetsuka) means 
“novelist.” To add to the complexity, one can note that some kanji do not have an onyomi pronunciation, 
because they were created in Japanese. 
63 Lacan’s thesis that Japanese people cannot be analyzed thus suffers from the fact that he does not take 
hiragana in particular into consideration. The Japanese language cannot be reduced to onyomi and kunyomi, 
and furthermore it seems that psychoanalytic practice in Japan would be more oriented towards the extended 
deployment of hiragana, which are more suitable for re-transcribing the play of signifiers.
64 For example, see “La psychanalyse au Japon” [Psychoanalysis in Japan] 2006.
65 In fact, this is what often happens in Japan with therapies that borrow the name “psychoanalysis”: there is an 
appropriation of certain parts of the psychoanalytic theory to create a psychotherapeutic model. 
66 “La psychanalyse au Japon” 2006, pp. 69–83.
67 In Japanese, several personal pronouns can be used to say “I”: watashi 私; watakushi 私; ore 俺; ware 我, 吾; boku 
僕. As a general rule, however, these forms are often not employed. We certainly could notice a similar sort of 
effacing of the subject in other languages, such as Spanish, but in such languages the conjugation of the verb 
always indicates the person. This is not the case in Japanese, where verbs do not conjugate. Japanese verbs only 
expresses the level of formality or the relation to temporality and never specify a grammatical subject.
68 This does not mean that truth is unimportant for Japanese people, but instead that it does not suppose any 
kind of subjective investment.
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Along these lines, if the unconscious is structured like a language, then any attempt to 
encourage the development of the practice of psychoanalysis in Japan would need to take as 
its point of departure the singularity of the Japanese language, with its syntactic structure 
that tends to elide the subject.
Translated by John Holland
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